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4.1 Introduction
The period from 1870 to 1913 was a period of globalization in both
goods and ﬁnancial markets that is comparable to the present era of glob-
alization. Also, it was a period rife with emerging market ﬁnancial crises,
which has great resonance for the experiences that we have observed in the
past decade. In both eras many emerging countries faced frequent cur-
rency crises, banking crises, and twin crises. They also faced a number of
debt crises. In the terminology of Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999),
many of these countries suﬀered from original sin. The external debt that
they accumulated to ﬁnance their development was almost totally denom-
inated in foreign currency or in terms of gold (or had gold clauses) before
1914, just as emerging market debt today is almost entirely denominated
in dollars, euros, or yen. When the exchange rate depreciates, debt service
in gold or foreign currency becomes very diﬃcult—leading to default, the
consequent drying up of external funding, and economic collapse.
The emerging country experience was in contrast to that of the advanced
core countries, which were ﬁnancially mature, had credibility, and could is-
sue bonds denominated in terms of their own currency. There were few
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Michael D. Bordo and Christopher M. Meissnercrises in these countries. This leads us to ask whether these very diﬀerent
debt structures might play a role in explaining the diﬀerence in crisis inci-
dence. We also wonder if debt management policies that created or allevi-
ated balance sheet mismatches mattered, as discussed in Goldstein and
Turner (2004). Finally, we examine whether poor reputation and accumu-
lated default experience was a problem, as hypothesized by Carmen Rein-
hart, Kenneth Rogoﬀ, and Miguel Savastano (2003) in their work on debt
intolerance.
We have developed a database to allow us to identify and distinguish
original sin and balance sheet crises from more traditional currency and
banking crises for roughly thirty countries (both advanced and emerging)
from 1880–1913. We have data both on the type of crisis incidence and on
the fundamentals that economists believe are determinants of crises.
Our results do not ﬁnd unambiguous support for the idea that hard cur-
rency debt for emerging markets is always associated with more ﬁnancial
turbulence. In fact, we ﬁnd evidence that the emerging markets of the day
that had signiﬁcant amounts of original sin can be divided into two sub-
groups. One group includes countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Italy, and Portugal, each of which suﬀered a ﬁnancial catastrophe between
1880 and 1913. The other group, including Australia, Canada, New Zea-
land, Norway, and the United States, had relatively little trouble with ﬁnan-
cial crises in terms of frequency or virulence. We ascribe this to special
country characteristics that other independent peripheral countries did
not possess.
We also ﬁnd that many countries matched their hard currency liabilities
with hard currency reserves or took out such debt in proportion to their ex-
port earning potential. This helped reduce exposure to currency and bank-
ing crises and kept banking and currency crises that did occur from be-
coming too severe. Nevertheless, even after controlling for the mismatch
position, original sin still appears to be associated with crises for many
vulnerable countries. Finally, there is a possibility that countries with bet-
ter international repayment records were able to avoid debt crises despite
high levels of debt.
4.2 History, Financial Crises, Balance Sheets, and Hard Currency Debt
In this paper we view banking trouble, currency crises, and debt crises
that occur in the same or consecutive years as interrelated phenomena.
This is perhaps diﬀerent from ﬁrst-generation models that viewed currency
crises as events arising from unsustainable ﬁscal policy under a pegged ex-
change rate. It is also diﬀerent from a strand of the literature that views
banking crises as arising uniquely from poor supervision, weak structure,
or stochastic liquidity runs. Our view is that while some countries had
crises that unfolded in ways the older generation of models would predict,
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rency crises) or even triple crises, where in addition to a large depreciation
and disruption in the banking sector the sovereign debt went into default.
One important factor determining the ultimate outcome may be an inter-
action between the nature of the debt contracts in place and the robustness
of the ﬁnancial system. Our framework for thinking about ﬁnancial crises
is very much parallel to that enunciated in Mishkin (2003), which in turn is
inspired by an open-economy approach to the credit channel transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. Balance sheets, net worth, and informa-
tional asymmetries are key ingredients in this type of model.
In our view, initial trouble might begin in the banking sector for a num-
ber of reasons. One possibility is that international interest rates rise. This
worsens the balance sheets of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and banks alike. As the
number of nonperforming loans rises and net worth falls, a decline in lend-
ing can occur, contributing further to output losses. At this point, interna-
tionally mobile capital may take a decidedly pessimistic view of returns in
the debtor country and either stop coming in (a sudden stop) or reverse it-
self, leaving signiﬁcant short-term ﬁnancing gaps. This reversal leads to
more trouble in the ﬁnancial sector and obviously increases stress for non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms that are forced to cut investment because of the lack of ﬁ-
nancing. Governments may have trouble making interest payments on
debt coming due as capital markets become unwilling to continue rolling
debt over. The capital ﬂow reversal, if large enough, could also force the
abandonment of an exchange rate peg and a large change in the nominal
exchange rate. Floating regimes could also see large depreciation occur un-
der such a scenario.
A contemporary view of the impact of such exchange rate changes is that
they may be contractionary.1 This is where original sin enters the picture.
Since the majority of obligations for nearly all countries are in foreign cur-
rency or, in the late nineteenth century, denominated in terms of a ﬁxed
amount of gold, depreciation vis-à-vis creditor countries or breaking the
link between gold and the domestic currency could lead to increases in the
real value of debt. This is a redistribution of wealth from domestic borrow-
ers to their creditors, who are expecting a certain amount of gold or foreign
currency.2 When net worth matters for lending decisions, this decline in the
net worth of creditors can lead to another round of “disintermediation,”
causing widespread bankruptcies due to liquidity problems. All else equal,
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1. Theoretical work by Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) demonstrates how under cer-
tain very plausible circumstances original sin can lead to contractionary depreciations.
2. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) argue that what matters is the aggregate ex-
ternal mismatch, and that if all debt is domestic, that one sector’s losses are the others’ gains.
Our view, however, is that net worth matters. When a debtor’s net worth deteriorates, bor-
rowing capacity falls, and the capital markets seize up. This is one reason why we focus on
domestic and external hard-currency debt rather than just foreign holdings (or issues) of
hard-currency debt.the deterioration to debtors’ balance sheets would be more severe the
greater the amount of ﬁxed interest rate hard-currency debt outstanding.
There is some contention in the literature as to whether all is in fact
equal. Goldstein and Turner (2004) have argued that often countries insure
themselves against exchange rate movements. Hard currency debt can be,
and often is, backed up by hard currency assets. Alternatively, countries
could have enough export capacity to oﬀset changes in liabilities due to ex-
change rate swings. To gauge the actual eﬀect of original sin one must take
account of the mismatch position or the entire balance sheet position of an
economy. We describe how we do this in the following. Moreover, Rein-
hart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) have argued that original sin is a proxy
for a weak ﬁnancial system and poor ﬁscal control. As we describe later, we
control for some of these fundamentals, too, allowing for a test of this hy-
pothesis.
4.2.1 The Role of Original Sin
It has been the case since at least the eighteenth century that debt issued
on international capital markets has been denominated in the currency of
the market of issue and not the currency of the issuing country. It has also
long been noted that such debt can become more onerous to repay in the
face of depreciations, and that since emerging markets often face rapid ex-
change rate depreciations associated with sudden stops and reversals of
capital inﬂows or very loose monetary policy, these countries are more of-
ten the victims of such a volatile combination.
Over the last ten years, these phenomena have started to be addressed in
the economics literature. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) argued that
the danger of exchange rate ﬂuctuations in the face of foreign currency bor-
rowing might oblige many countries to adopt hard currency pegs. They
coined the term “original sin” because they argued that foreign currency-
denominated debt was imposed by international capital markets. Nations
with poor reputations, and even nations with good reputations or solid fun-
damentalsare obliged to issue debt in key international currencies. In other
words, domestic policies or problems were not the only reason countries
could not borrow in their own currencies. Because of original sin and the
problems that could be generated in the face of a devaluation, Eichengreen
and Hausmann (1999) argued that exchange rate policy was of the utmost
importance, even for those countries where fundamentals and ﬁscal poli-
cies were sound but which might fall victim to a liquidity run.
While we have a bit more to say about the origins of original sin in sec-
tion 4.4.4, one key controversy remains. Exactly how harmful is original
sin? Early work by Eichengreen and Hausmann used mainly anecdotal ev-
idence both on the incidence of original sin and its eﬀects. Very recent work
by the same authors along with Ugo Panizza (Eichengreen, Hausmann,
and Panizza 2005) has shown that countries with higher original sin have
142 Michael D. Bordo and Christopher M. Meissnerhigher exchange rate volatility and higher macroeconomic volatility. Flan-
dreau (2003) argues that in the nineteenth century depreciation increased
the debt burden because of original sin, which led to sovereign debt crises.
He illustrates this with reference to several cases. But we are unaware of
any work which has attempted to ﬁnd a systematic empirical association
between original sin and ﬁnancial crises.3
We collected data from various national sources on hard currency debt
and augmented and compared this with data made available by Flandreau
and Zúmer (2004). What we refer to as hard currency debt is debt that car-
ried a gold clause or was made payable at a ﬁxed rate in a foreigncurrency.4
Our measure of original sin is the ratio of this quantity to total public debt
outstanding.
This measure is diﬀerent from, but related to, the measures of original
sin deﬁned in Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005). One of their
measures of international original sin for country i based on securities is-
sued by residents and nonresidents internationally is
OSi   max 1   , 0 .
One key diﬀerence between markets today and in our period under study
is that recently debt has been issued in quite a few small-country currencies
by agents from lending countries, allowing opportunities for debt swaps.
That is, for some countries, the numerator and the denominator in the dif-
ference term diﬀer substantially because many other countries issue debt
in their currency. To the best of our knowledge it does not appear that for-
eigners pre-1914 were issuing debt in other exotic currencies. In the pre-
1914 case, original sin was not reduced through swaps (Flandreau 2003,
20), hence we can restrict attention in the numerator of this expression to
securities issued in local currency (without gold clauses) only by residents.
The other key diﬀerence between our measure and the workhorse mea-
Securities issued in currency i
    
Securities issued by country i
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3. Our conclusions diﬀer from Flandreau’s, as we take on a wider set of hypotheses and
cases. Empirical work by Flandreau and Zúmer (2004), which regresses sovereign bond yields
on a ratio of interest service to government revenues and a number of other variables, also ar-
gues that hard currency or gold debt was dangerous. Their tests are quite diﬀerent from ours
since our dependent variables are debt crises, banking crises, currency crises, or twin crises.
Frankel and Rose (1996) examined “currency crashes,” external debt, and exchange rate ﬂuc-
tuations, but their approach to measuring original sin, its impact, and the type of crises con-
sidered is diﬀerent than ours.
4. Our data appendix has more to say about the structure of this debt. Flandreau and
Zúmer (2004) highlight just some of the diﬃculties in deﬁning this type of debt. Italian bonds,
for example, had de facto gold clauses for foreigners but not for residents, but de jure gold
clauses for both classes of creditors for a certain proportion of the debt. Likewise, Spain ar-
bitrarily implemented a residency distinction for manner of repayment around 1900. U.S.
debt was sometimes vague ex ante about the terms of repayment and often repayment was
promised “in specie.” Mostly this was meant to be gold but could have meant silver, which sec-
ularly depreciated against gold after 1873. Still, our measure is at least a good proxy for the
variable of interest.sure in Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005) is that we look at debt
issued in domestic and international markets instead of looking only at in-
ternational issues. One reason we view this as important is because many
domestic issues of the day carried gold clauses. As described previously, in
the case where monetary authorities devalued the local currency in terms
of gold this would have a similar eﬀect to a depreciation when a country
had foreign currency debt. In either event, real debt repayments for local
currency gold clause debt and for foreign currency debt would both in-
crease.5 Hence, we do not classify debt as “debt issued in currency i” if it
contained a gold clause stipulating a ﬁxed quantity of gold per unit of lo-
cal currency payable. Only debt payable in local paper currency without
mention of the gold-local currency exchange rate upon payment of
coupons and principal is included in the ratio above.
Figure 4.1 shows the ratio of hard-currency government debt to total
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5. We are ﬁnessing the question of what happens to the real exchange rate and prices in gen-
eral. We assume here that nominal depreciations are perhaps equivalent to real depreciations
in the short-run because of sticky prices. On the domestic side we assume going oﬀ gold or a
depreciation implies a depreciation of the local currency versus gold and that domestic prices
are constant over the short run.
Fig. 4.1 Hard currency debt as a percentage of total public debt, 1880–1913government debt by country between 1880 and 1913. Our time series plots
reveal most countries’ measure of original sin to be constant over time.
Some countries’ situations worsened. Japan became more exposed to for-
eign currency debt as it entered global capital markets from the late 1890s.
Argentina and Brazil converted local currency paper debt into gold clause
debt in the 1890s. Only Spain and Italy appear to have decidedly decreased
their reliance on hard currency debt relative to internal currency debt.
These nations often had ﬂoating currencies throughout the period. As
noted by Flandreau and Sussman (2005), their situations appear similar to
those of Russia and Austria-Hungary, countries which had relatively low
degrees of original sin and which also had ﬂoating currencies over most of
the period we cover. These are the counterexamples to those who believe
that poor ﬁscal history, a shaky exchange rate policy, and economic back-
wardness are causes of original sin. Nearly all of these countries had pre-
vious episodes of debt default and chronically poor ﬁscal situations. We
subsequently return to this story.
The long-run averages of our original sin measure in ﬁgure 4.2 also re-
veal a counterintuitive ranking, but are consistent with previous ﬁnd-
ings by Flandreau and Sussman (2005) and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and
Panizza (2005). Financial centers have less original sin. Small peripheral
countries have a lot of original sin. Countries with ostensibly rotten ﬁscal
institutions and poor international track records have intermediate levels
of original sin. Notice that Spain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Ar-
gentina are all toward the lower middle of the spectrum. However, some
countries with sound ﬁscal, ﬁnancial, and monetary records, like Denmark
and Sweden, also fall into this range. These countries, like others in west-
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Fig. 4.2 Average ratio of hard currency public debt to total public debt, 1880–1913ern Europe, had ﬁnancial institutions that were evolving in the same direc-
tion as the core. The question then becomes: are these fundamentals, along
with the historical and current ﬁscal positions, more important for ex-
plaining crisis incidence than the actual level of hard-currency debt?
4.2.2 Currency Mismatches
Goldstein and Turner (2004) have argued that currency mismatches are
the main problem with foreign currency debt. Countries that have foreign
currency liabilities that are not oﬀset by foreign currency assets may be
more likely than countries with more foreign assets to ﬁnd it diﬃcult to re-
pay their foreign currency debts in the event of a depreciation. On the mar-
gin, changes in the exchange rate can become a problem the greater the
mismatch, as local currency assets lose value in terms of foreign liabilities.
Goldstein and Turner have three key ingredients in their overall measure of
a nation’s mismatch. They ﬁrst use the diﬀerence between all reported for-
eign assets and foreign currency liabilities outstanding. They then divide
this measure by exports (or imports if the diﬀerence is positive) to account
for openness to trade.6 For example, the mismatch decreases when exports
are higher because a depreciation would likely attract a larger amount of
extra revenue and thus such a country would be more naturally hedged. Fi-
nally, they premultiply this ratio by the ratio of all reported foreign cur-
rency liabilities to all reported liabilities outstanding.
Data on bank and nonbank foreign assets is diﬃcult to assemble today
and probably impossible for the pre-World War I era. We focus on the gov-
ernment’s mismatch and believe this is a relatively good proxy for the
economy-wide mismatch. The functional form we choose is diﬀerent
fromGoldstein and Turner and slightly closer to that found in Eichengreen,
Hausmann, and Panizza (2003).7 For country i we have
Mismatchi  
Our measure of reserves usually only includes gold reserves held at the
central bank, in the banking system, or held by the government treasury.
international reserves  total hard currency debt outstanding
       
exports
146 Michael D. Bordo and Christopher M. Meissner
6. Goldstein and Turner (2004) choose a functional form so that the boost to exports from
a depreciation improves a nation’s balance sheet. Though the Goldstein and Turner measure
(and our version of theirs) is one measure of the balance sheet position, it is not the ideal mea-
sure of a nation’s balance sheet. There are omitted ingredients that could make a diﬀerence to
the balance sheet. For example, for this period, one could theoretically reﬁne this measure by
including foreign currency and gold revenues collected through tariﬀs, exports to gold stan-
dard countries, and imports from such countries as a measure of hard currency earnings and
liabilities, and foreign assets held in banks. Most of these data would be impossible to collect
for a reasonable number of observations. Also, in section 4.4 we discuss how the omission in
our mismatch measure of certain types of assets could explain the fact that some countries
with high original sin seem less crisis prone.
7. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) report that the correlation between their
measure of mismatch and the Goldstein and Turner measure is 0.82.The sources are listed in the appendix. Total hard currency debt (domestic
and international issues) is calculated directly if the data is available or by
multiplying the total debt outstanding by the percentage of total debt that
is payable in gold or foreign currencies. A higher mismatch measure should
be correlated with fewer ﬁnancial crises. As such it compares with the
Goldstein and Turner measure. Nevertheless, it does take a diﬀerent func-
tional form and potentially does leave out a signiﬁcant fraction of total as-
sets and liabilities in the economy. One should also note that as the mis-
match measure increases, damage to the net worth of a country inﬂicted by
a depreciation should be smaller.8
The mismatch measure above risks combining ﬂow measures (exports)
with stock measures. As an alternative measure of mismatch, we substitute
the amount of total hard-currency debt outstanding by the total amount of
interest payments due in gold or foreign currency. This is estimated as the
product of the ratio of hard currency debt outstanding to the total interest
payments on all types of debt.9 Interest payments come from Flandreau
and Zúmer (2004) and are only available for a smaller set of countries.
4.2.3 Debt Intolerance
A new literature on sovereign ﬁnancial diﬃculties emphasizes the role of
past defaults in creating current diﬃculties. Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savas-
tano (2003; RRS) have coined the term debt intolerance. This line of re-
search tries to explain why some countries are able to sustain very high
debt-to-GDP ratios while other emerging-market countries run into debt
problems with comparatively low debt-to-GDP ratios. Their evidence sug-
gests that past defaults generate poor sovereign ratings. Countries with
worse track records in international capital markets suﬀer greater ﬁnancial
fragility due to increased borrowing costs at a given level of debt to GDP.
An alternative view might be that default history or sovereign ratings are
proxies for other underlying structural or institutional problems. Hence we
would also like to control for such fundamentals, as far as possible, to al-
low for the possibility of graduation from debt intolerance.
Given these hypotheses, we would like our tests to include a measure of
default history. Accordingly, we take two routes to control for this. First
we interact a public debt to government revenue ratio with an indicator
Financial Crises, 1880–1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt 147
8. Goldstein and Turner (2004) note that net worth increases with depreciation for net cred-
itors. To get around the fact that an increase in the denominator of mismatch would decrease
the mismatch measure for net creditors they divide by imports when assets exceed liabilities.
For all of the results we present we divide by exports. We also tried dividing by imports when
appropriate. The two measures have a correlation of 0.999. Our results do not change signif-
icantly when we divide by imports for those observations with positive numerators.
9. Of course, diﬀerent face value interest rates for paper and gold debts will aﬀect how ac-
curate this measure is for the countries that have original sin measures between 0 and 1. The
actual diﬀerence between the face value interest rate for a gold and paper debt was one per-
centage point for Brazil in the 1890s.variable that equals one if a country had at least one default episode be-
tween 1800 and 1880. Alternatively, we interact the debt-to-revenue ratio
with an indicator equal to one if the country is in the periphery.10If the in-
crease in the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis for a marginal increase in the
debt-to-revenue ratio is larger for a peripheral country or a past defaulter,
we would argue there is evidence in support of the debt intolerance hy-
pothesis.
4.2.4 Other Data and Hypotheses
The literature on predicting ﬁnancial crises with econometric techniques
is abundant. Our approach is inspired by the pared down methodology of
Frankel and Rose (1996), who looked at currency crashes at the annual
level. Many subsequent papers have made modiﬁcations to this early at-
tempt and have largely been equally unsuccessful at accurately predicting
any type of ﬁnancial crisis.11 However, some approaches and explanatory
variables have done reasonably well in predicting crises, or at least being
strongly and statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with crises in a way con-
sonant with priors based on economic theory.
We attempt to control for the union of the most important variables
from the extant literature that is applicable to the time period at hand. The
list includes total outstanding government debt divided by government
revenue, growth in the terms of trade, the deviation of the real exchange
rate from the period average, the current account balance divided by nom-
inal GDP, the yield spread between British consols and long-term govern-
ment bonds, an indicator for whether the country maintained a gold stan-
dard, growth of the money supply, the ratio of gold reserves in the banking
system to notes in circulation, and the GDP-weighted average spread on
British consols for long-term bonds. The variables used depend on which
type of crisis we are examining and are well indicated in the respective
tables. Our sources and deﬁnitions of these variables are located in the data
appendix.
Our sample includes the twenty-one countries examined in Bordo et al.
(2001). We have also added information on crises and macrodata for nine
other countries. These new additions include Austria-Hungary, Egypt, In-
dia, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive macrohistorical
data set ever constructed to analyze the determinants of various types of ﬁ-
nancial crises.
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10. The periphery indicator comes from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). The periphery coun-
tries are Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Finland, Greece, India, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and Uruguay.
11. See Berg and Patillo (1999) for a broad comparison of some important papers in this lit-
erature.4.2.5 Crises, 1880–1913
In ﬁgure 4.3 we present the frequency of various types of crises (bank-
ing, currency, twin, debt, and any type of crisis).12 This is the number of
years a country was in crisis divided by total possible years of observation.
We use the country-year as the unit of observation, and eliminate all coun-
try-years that witness ongoing crises from the denominator, to come up
with a total number for years of observation. We note the pattern found in
Bordo et al. (2001) in terms of the relative frequency of types of crises (i.e.,
that the predominant form of crises before 1914 was banking crises, fol-
lowed by currency crises, twin, and debt crises).13 Nevertheless, the ab-
solute magnitude of the probability for each type of crisis increases slightly
compared to their ﬁgure with our addition of another ten countries.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present scatter plots of the percentage of time a coun-
try was in a crisis episode versus our measure of original sin and our mismatch
variables.14 There appears to be a quadratic relationship between debt crises
and original sin. Countries with intermediate ranges of original sin seem to
take longer to resolve their debt crises than those at either end of the spectrum.
It seems intuitive that the ﬁnancial centers which were more economi-
cally developed had fewer crises than nations like Russia, Argentina, and
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Fig. 4.3 Crisis frequency in percent probability per year, 1880–1913
12. Our crisis dates and the methodology we use to classify years of crisis are listed in the
appendix.
13. Debt crises were not demarcated by Bordo et al. (2001).
14. Our measure of the percentage of time spent in a crisis is the ratio of the number of years
in which a crisis ﬁrst occurred or was ongoing divided by the number of years in the sample,
which is 34. For debt crises, the numerator is the number of years in which there was no reso-
lution or international agreement on debt repayment.Italy. But what about the countries with high measures of original sin but
fewer crises? These data points include primarily the British oﬀshoots like
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, but also small Eu-
ropean countries like Norway and Finland. Perhaps this hump-shaped re-
lationship is evidence that original sin is not always related to more ﬁnan-
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Fig. 4.4 Crisis frequencies by country versus the average level of hard currency
public debt to total public debt, 1880–1913
Fig. 4.5 Crisis frequencies by country versus the average level of the “mismatch”
measure, 1880–1913
Notes: The mismatch variable for debt crises uses interest payments. The mismatch for other
types of crises uses debt outstanding. See text for explanations.cial fragility. It could be that these countries avoided crises because of their
strong ﬁnancial systems and ﬁscal institutions, especially when compared
to the southern European periphery and the Latin American countries,
which make up most of the observations in the middle ground. The next
section looks at some case studies that illuminate this ﬁnding. The follow-
ing section uses econometrics to control for a host of other plausible fac-
tors that might be omitted from this sample scatter plot. We conclude that
for debt crises and banking crises this quadratic relationship is still visible
and quite meaningful in telling us what matters for managing original sin.
4.3 Historical Evidence
How well does the overarching framework of ﬁnancial crises discussed
previously match up to the historical record? What role did contempo-
raries assign to hard currency debt and ﬁscal mismanagement as causes of
the numerous ﬁnancial crises that occurred between 1880 and 1913? We
discuss the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and the United States to
address these questions. These places shared the distinction of being pe-
ripheral capital-importing countries, and so these, in many respects, make
for good comparisons in a case study.15Figures 4.6 through 4.9 plot the lev-
els of our original sin measure, the mismatch variable (measured using to-
tal debt outstanding), and the gold reserve ratio for them. The original sin
and mismatch variables look fairly similar in levels. They also take the
same paths in the run-up to their crises. The notable exception to this pat-
tern is the evolution of the ratios of gold to bank notes in circulation. These
are rather high and fairly level for Australia and the United States, but they
are low and decreasing for Brazil and Argentina. This highlights the divi-
sion of the periphery into the two subgroups we mentioned earlier. All four
of these countries had a ﬁnancial crisis in the 1890s. Brazil and Argentina
had near total ﬁnancial meltdowns and sovereign debt defaults. Australia
and the United States experienced relatively serious banking crises in 1893
but by no means faced ﬁnancial disintegration. They both avoided debt de-
fault and massive currency depreciations. The robustness of the ﬁnancial
systems and the governments’ ﬁscal position, along with a few other idio-
syncratic factors, make the diﬀerence between the outcomes.
Perhaps the most notorious of the late nineteenth-century crises is the
Baring crisis that hit London and Argentina in late 1890.16 In Argentina,
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15. It is debatable whether the United States qualiﬁes as a peripheral country in this period;
indeed, our periphery indicator does not classify it as such. Its real income in both total and
per capita terms was as high as the advanced countries of western Europe that comprised the
core countries. It was also similar in overall economic development. However, before 1900 it
was, like the other emergers, a major capital importer. See Bordo and Schwartz (1996) and
Flandreau and Jobst (2004).
16. See Eichengreen (1997) for an in-depth discussion of this event and a comparison be-
tween it and the Mexican crisis of 1994.this crisis was a triple crisis involving a banking meltdown, a currency cri-
sis, and a suspension of payments on national debt. The 1880s witnessed a
“ﬁesta ﬁnanciera.” Fiscal excess and a dubious banking situation reigned.
Government spending also took oﬀ in the 1880s. Much of the spending
was ﬁnanced by local and foreign borrowing, and it was unaccompanied
by short-term revenue increases. Bank lending to the national and state
governments increased at a harried pace. Foreign purchases of the large
amount of (paper peso) bonds issued by local mortgage banks rose
throughout the 1880s. Note issues by banks in excess of statutory levels
also made the Argentine position even more precarious. There was also
a lack of political will to increase tax revenues from import duties in the
late 1880s.
Borrowing became harder and harder for Argentina in the late 1880s. As
foreign lending started to dry up, the government propped up the mortgage
banks through the mortgage bond (cedulas) market by guaranteeing that
these bonds, which were originally issued in paper, would be paid in gold.
This policy increased Argentina’s hard-currency liabilities as a percentage
of the total at a time when reserves were being used (unsuccessfully) to
prop up the paper peso. Figure 4.6 shows how this simultaneously raised
the original sin measure and made the mismatch worse.
When the Bank of England raised its discount rate from 2.5 to 6 percent
in 1889, the disaster exploded. Baring, overextended because of Argen-
tina’s insolvency, was bailed out by a consortium of British banks in a life-
boat operation arranged by the Bank of England (Bordo 2003). The govern-
ment of Argentina suspended payments on its debts. The two major banks
152 Michael D. Bordo and Christopher M. Meissner
Fig. 4.6 Original sin, mismatch, and gold cover ratio for Argentina, 1880–1913of Buenos Aires were liquidated in 1890. The most notable facets of this
crisis are its near textbook sequence of events and the striking move by Ar-
gentine authorities to “dollarize” its debts when in such a precarious po-
sition. The ease with which this occurred suggests that decreasing currency
risk made the debt seem more attractive for foreign investors. But of course
this would only be true as long as these investors neglected the possibility
that depreciation itself would cause the debt burden to become unsustain-
able.
It is also extremely interesting that Brazil (also under a ﬂoating exchange
rate regime) undertook a local currency to hard-currency debt conversion
in 1890 similar in eﬀect to Argentina’s. The government converted 5 per-
cent paper bonds to 4 percent gold bonds and instituted collection of
tariﬀs in gold in order to help pay these obligations. Levy (1995) argues
that authorities viewed gold bonds as a less expensive way to fund deﬁcits.
The conversion itself helped raise Brazil’s original sin measure from less
than 0.5 to nearly 0.7 (see ﬁgure 4.7). According to our data, the Brazilian
mismatch using total debt service worsened from –1.26 to –1.38 while the
mismatch measure using interest service improved from –0.058 to –0.049.
Neither move seems extremely large in comparison with the increase in the
original sin measure we have seen. But this conversion surely contributed
to Brazil’s fragility, culminating in the banking crisis of 1897 and the cur-
rency and debt crisis of 1898.
Like in Argentina, the run-up to the Brazilian crisis witnessed fairly
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Fig. 4.7 Original sin, mismatch, and gold cover ratio for Brazil, 1880–1913heavy depreciation of the real as well as civil unrest. The price of coﬀee, an
important export, also tumbled. The depreciation of the real was caused by
excessive note issues, weak bank regulation, and continual government
pressure for advances. Moreover, the gold tariﬀ was eliminated in 1891,
further damaging the government’s balance sheet. The government reas-
sumed the monopoly over note issues from the domestic banks of issue in
1895.
All was not bleak in the 1890s. London markets accepted new issues
from Brazil, and these funds were used to continue servicing the external
debt. Moreover, coﬀee prices recovered somewhat and rubber exports be-
gan to take oﬀ. If the government had not embarked upon a number of new
military operations and continued with the construction of military instal-
lations up to 1898, the ﬁscal position might not have looked so grim. As it
happened, the banking crisis of 1897 and heavy depreciation in 1897 con-
spired to create a currency crash and ﬁnally a suspension on debt payments
in 1898.
For the United States and Australia the 1890s were also a turbulent
decade. Australia had a banking crisis in 1893. The U.S. Treasury suﬀered
heavy gold losses in 1891 (see ﬁgure 4.8). In 1893 the United States was hit
by a short-lived banking panic coupled with more gold reserve losses. De-
spite the turbulence, neither country ended up with a debt crisis, the ex-
change rates were not allowed to depreciate, and the banking systems
withstood the pressure. Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that, by our
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Fig. 4.8 Original sin, mismatch, and gold cover ratio for the United States, 
1880–1913measures, Australia at this time had a debt-to-revenue ratio of roughly
nine, which is in the 90th percentile of our sample, and a slightly worse mis-
match position than Brazil had in the 1890s.
The story of the crisis in Australia (see ﬁgure 4.9) is that land speculation
had reached a frenzied pace by the early 1890s. Banks were lending for
long-term projects. Historians have called attention to the maturity mis-
match that characterized such lending. A tariﬀ rise in 1892 contributed to
falling government revenues, probably weakening market conﬁdence at the
same time. London markets also tightened up in response to global ﬁnan-
cial turmoil in the early 1890s. Banks formed an association to protect
themselves in 1892, but public depositor conﬁdence was shattered in 1893
when an important bank was allowed to fail. Finally, export prices fell,
making debt servicing all the more diﬃcult.
Some observers have claimed that the crisis was not all that severe and
that recovery had begun by 1893 (Dowd 1992). Adalet and Eichengreen
(2005) emphasize that the crisis and current account reversal that accom-
panied it depended on deﬂation and a reduction in expenditures. They note
that debt default never occurred as it did in Argentina and later in Brazil,
perhaps because membership in the British Empire ruled it out.
Policy measures that surely helped alleviate the ﬁnancial severity of the
crisis include: a ﬁve day bank holiday, the government policy, which al-
lowed for a slight increase in the legal maximum note issue, and paper
money being declared legal tender in New South Wales. Dowd also sug-
gests that no balance sheet problems or disintermediation occurred, since
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Fig. 4.9 Original sin, mismatch, and gold cover ratio for Australia, 1880–1913there is no evidence that advances declined during the period. Moreover,
he observes that the biggest banks had prudently prepared for the worst by
1890 by divesting themselves of speculative assets.
In the United States, a combination of luck and a strong ﬁnancial sys-
tem averted a total meltdown in the 1890s. The main characteristic of the
currency turbulence in 1891 and in 1893 was the heavy loss of the Trea-
sury’s reserves. Open market purchases of securities by the Treasury, a tax
of 40 cents per $1,000 on gold exports, the McKinley tariﬀ, and a bumper
crop in the United States, which was swiftly exported to Europe, where
there was a major crop failure, all combined to avert massive disaster and
bring calm to markets by late 1891.
In 1893 international markets once again doubted the U.S. commitment
to the gold standard. A move to a de facto silver standard was factored into
expectations.17 The closure of the mint to silver in June 1893 in India cre-
ated expectations of continued depreciation of silver in terms of gold. This
would have meant continuing depreciation against gold currencies for a
silver-based dollar, and so provided a possible speculative opportunity. In
fact, a self-fulﬁlling attack on the dollar was nearly successful. The Trea-
sury’s gold reserves dropped quickly and obligations to repay debt in gold
stood at a high level. Markets speculated that gold reserves would continue
to diminish. This contributed to further gold outﬂows. In June of 1893
the clearing house syndicate of New York met, but many banks were still
pushed to the limit of their legal reserve requirements. Nevertheless,
prominent political defeats for prosilver activists, including the repeal of
the Sherman Silver Purchase Act (a sop to prosilver forces passed in 1890)
helped assuage market fears. A rescue package engineered by Belmont and
Morgan, who purchased $62 million in bonds yielding nearly $35 million
in gold for the treasury, also helped suppress the attack.
The strength of the U.S. and the Australian ﬁnancial systems in com-
parison to the South American cases mentioned earlier is evident here.18
We think that the outbreak of crisis in these examples follows a fairly sys-
tematic pattern, very similar in nature to the framework laid out previ-
ously. This is so especially as it relates to credit expansion, over-
indebtedness, and vulnerability induced by rises in foreign interest rates.
But there is a major divergence at the point when we try to understand how
hard-currency debt matters. For the two southern cone countries, hard-
currency debt proved dangerous and default ensued. For Australia and the
United States, two places where debt was payable strictly in a ﬁxed amount
of gold or foreign currency, balance sheet eﬀects did not overwhelm the
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17. Calomiris (1992) argues that markets were expecting a good chance of a temporary sus-
pension of gold convertibility and a small devaluation of the dollar.
18. Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2004) look at the success of dealing with capital mar-
ket shocks over the last 100 years and make an interesting comparison between Australia and
Chile.economies. Exchange rate commitments did not fail. Most importantly,
the ﬁnancial systems were robust. And ﬁnally, in Australia, Empire made
the diﬀerence. In the United States, Belmont and Morgan and the material
interests and strength of the New York banking industry mattered. These
are key diﬀerences from Argentina and Brazil. The U.S. and Australian
case illustrate why original sin is not always dangerous. The statistical work
we turn to now provides more support for these assertions.
4.4 Statistical Findings
Our statistical approach is fairly basic. We seek mainly to ﬁnd a multi-
variate way to summarize the data by correlating crisis probabilities with
a set of explanatory variables.19 We use probit speciﬁcations, and the de-
pendent variable is the ﬁrst year of a debt crisis, currency crisis, banking
crisis, or twin crisis. Our data set is an unbalanced panel, and the observa-
tional unit is the country year. We omit country years that include ongoing
crises. Throughout, we control for the lack of statistical independence be-
tween country observations by using heteroscedasticity robust, country-
clustered standard errors.20 We ﬁrst present speciﬁcations with as many
variables as is feasible and then as a robustness check we drop the most sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant variables so as to avoid possible collinearity prob-
lems and to include more observations.21
One thing we ﬁnd consistently, even when conditioning on other vari-
ables and in other sensitivity analysis, is a quadratic relationship between
the ratio of hard currency debt to total debt and the frequency of debt and
banking crises. This suggests that original sin may contribute to more ﬁ-
nancial crises but that sometimes the damage can be limited by other
means.
Holding our measure of the currency mismatch constant however, no re-
lationship between original sin and currency crises is apparent. We view
most currency crises as a symptom of capital ﬂight from a crumbling ﬁ-
nancial sector and liquidity problems, and think that original sin is in-
directly associated with currency crises. As the framework provided pre-
viously would predict, we see that initial problems in the banking sector
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19. Endogeneity of the regressors as well as usual speciﬁcation problems may be present in
our speciﬁcations. We attempted to mitigate endogeneity biases in unreported speciﬁcations
by using lagged values of the explanatory variables. Results in these cases did not change dras-
tically in qualitative terms. Of course, this solution is only valid if variables are not too per-
sistent. Also, using lags creates measurement error issues that are likely to be problematic for
estimation.
20. We estimated random eﬀects probit models as well but found them to perform weakly.
The estimated correlation between within-country observations was poorly estimated.
21. The appendix lists the key variables and their availability for each country so the reader
can see what the various samples look like. The issue of model speciﬁcation is, of course, not
trivial. We are taking a decidedly reduced form approach, and we use the econometrics as
supplements to the qualitative theoretical conclusions and historical record.(proxied by one-year ahead indicators of debt crises and banking crises)
are strongly associated with currency crises. Hence one possibility is that
original sin aﬀects debt sustainability or the soundness of the banking sec-
tor, and then these problems with debt and the banking system can create
a currency run, which further contributes to balance sheet trouble and pos-
sibly ﬁnancial implosion.
Moreover, we document a link between currency crises and mismatches
or weak reserve positions. This is evidence supportive of the idea that the
outbreak of currency crises is the symptom of liquidity problems or per-
haps deeper solvency troubles in the economy that contribute to specula-
tive capital outﬂows and sudden stops. Some weak evidence shows that
mismatches are associated with debt crises, too. Finally, some inconclusive
evidence points also to debt intolerance as a factor in debt crises, without
ruling out a role for original sin or mismatches.
4.4.1 Debt Crises
Table 4.1 presents results from various speciﬁcations where the initial
year of a debt crisis is the dependent variable. Column (1) presents a com-
prehensive speciﬁcation that includes a variable set as large as possible and
that also allows for controls for original sin and currency mismatches. We
see that there is a quadratic in original sin, in mismatches (as measured us-
ing interest payments rather than total debt outstanding), and there is evi-
dence of debt intolerance. These variables are statistically signiﬁcant (at
better than the 90 percent level of conﬁdence) at the means for each for
each of these controls.22 The size of the estimated coeﬃcients is sympto-
matic of the low predicted incidence of debt crises. Since the incidence in
the sample is barely two percent, this is understandable.
We interpret the quadratic in original sin as stating that more original
sin is associated with a higher likelihood of a debt crisis, but those obser-
vations with very high levels of original sin face a lower likelihood. Again,
these are the countries in the areas of recent settlement like Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and the United States, which had strong ﬁnancial sys-
tems, good ﬁscal institutions, and which borrowed largely for productive
investments.
In terms of mismatch, there is evidence that past a certain level a better
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22. As usual in a probit model, the actual marginal eﬀect, the standard error, and statisti-
cal signiﬁcance depend on the levels of the covariates in a nonlinear way. We calculated these
eﬀects for each observation for particular speciﬁcations and found that magnitudes and sta-
tistical signiﬁcance varied considerably (e.g., see ﬁgures 4.10 and 4.11). On the whole, we of-
ten ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of interest are statistically signiﬁcant and have the most impact
at the extremes of the empirical distributions. Moreover, the statistical signiﬁcance of the in-
teraction eﬀect must be approached with caution. We are interested in the statistical signiﬁ-
cance of the partial derivative of the probability with respect to, say, hard-currency debt at
various values (e.g., the average) but do not always report thep-values here. For simplicity we
focus mainly on this ﬁrst partial derivative.Table 4.1 Determinants of debt crises
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hard-currency debt as a percentage  6.44 2.32 3.44
of total debt (1.89)∗∗∗ (0.92)∗∗ (1.07)∗∗∗
Square of hard-currency debt ratio –4.71 –3.46 –4.33
(2.05)∗∗∗ (0.61)∗∗∗ (0.82)∗∗∗
Debt/Revenue –0.40 0.16 0.23 –0.05
(0.11)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.12)
Debt/Revenue   pre-1880 default 1.04 0.28
(0.26)∗∗∗ (0.15)
Pre-1880 default –8.81 –2.74
(2.83)∗∗∗ (1.18)∗∗
Mismatch 7.41 4.16
(4.17) (1.67)∗∗
Square of mismatch –25.7 –11.40
(13.13)∗∗ (6.61)
Growth of terms of trade –31.93 –13.98 –13.22 –16.56
(19.66) (11.42) (9.86) (14.24)
ln (deviation of real exchange rate from  –6.02 –2.39 –2.46 –3.22
period average) (4.33) (1.72) (1.77) (2.06)
Trade balance/GDP –4.94
(5.22)
Spread on U.K. consol –0.18
(0.17)
Gold standard dummy 1.65
(0.73)∗∗∗
Growth of the money supply –1.59
(3.14)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation –12.01 –3.76 –5.69 –4.32
(3.43)∗∗∗ (2.11) (1.41)∗∗∗ (1.19)∗∗∗
Market portfolio spread 3.44 1.92 2.40 1.77
(1.72)∗∗∗ (0.77)∗∗ (1.15)∗∗ (0.86)∗∗
Constant –3.88 –5.72 –6.30 –3.80
(3.67) (1.31)∗∗∗ (2.24)∗∗∗ (1.31)∗∗∗
No. of observations 371 533 427 533
Percentage of correct positives 83 66.67 66.67 66.67
Percentage of correct negatives 97 98 97 98
Pseudo R2 0.60 0.45 0.45 0.48
Log-likelihood value –12.11 –17.9 –17.21 –17.04
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a debt crisis. “Robust” clustered standard errors are
in parentheses. See the text for precise deﬁnitions of variables. Positive signiﬁes crisis year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.mismatch position leads to a lower likelihood of a debt crisis.23 But the
quadratic pattern suggests that in the neighborhood of an intermediate
level of mismatch a marginally better mismatch is associated with a higher
chance of a default. The reason is likely to be because those countries that
have in fact recently defaulted on their debt but still have the fundamentals
that strongly suggest a default have cut their interest payments and thereby
have drastically improved their mismatch position (e.g., Argentina and
Brazil in the mid-1890s). This makes it appear as if intermediate mismatch
positions are associated with fewer crises, when in fact the opposite is the
case. We think that the data show that better mismatches are intuitively as-
sociated with a lower chance of a debt debacle.
Most other variables have signs that ﬁt our priors. Improvements in the
terms of trade, real depreciations, more gold reserves relative to notes out-
standing, slower growth of monetary aggregates, and a calmer interna-
tional environment in capital markets are all associated with lower proba-
bilities of debt crises. The statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients on these
variables varies, however. Meanwhile, lower local bond spreads (statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant) and adherence to the gold standard (statistically signif-
icant) imply a higher propensity to have a crisis. The positive coeﬃcient on
the gold standard does not disappear if we include it in the other speciﬁ-
cations, but the coeﬃcient is not statistically indistinguishable from zero.24
In ﬁgure 4.10 we also present a scatter plot of the marginal eﬀects of the
hard-currency debt ratios (calculated at the actual values of the covariates)
versus the actual levels of hard-currency debt. We see that for intermediate
ranges of original sin that the coeﬃcient varies a lot but is likely to be posi-
tive, whereas, toward the extremes, the marginal eﬀects are likely to be near
zero or even negative. Figure 4.11presents the z-statistics for the test that the
marginal eﬀect is diﬀerent from zero. When evaluated at the actual values,
only a minority of these have z-statistics high enough to be considered sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Only the highest in absolute value are signiﬁcant. This
roughly backs up the visual impression received from the previous ﬁgure.
We also provide a measure of the ﬁt of the model. This is gauged by the
percentage of actual crises that were predicted to be crisis episodes, and the
percentage of noncrisis years that are predicted to be noncrisis years. We
use a predicted probability of greater than 0.1 to classify a country as hav-
ing a debt crisis. This is a low threshold, but debt crises are relatively rare
in the raw sample. (The sample frequency is 0.01.) For the debt crises, the
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23. Recall that our mismatch variable increases as the mismatch decreases.
24. Unreported, likelihood ratio tests between the shorter and longer models cannot reject
their equivalence. Perhaps the positive coeﬃcient on the gold standard variable is compatible
with theories that argue that rigid exchange rates amplify negative external shocks more than
ﬂexible rates. But since the statistical signiﬁcance varies a lot by speciﬁcation we do not see
overwhelming evidence for any hypothesis suggesting a positive or negative coeﬃcient here.
See Edwards (2003) for a thorough discussion of exchange rate regimes and crises.Fig. 4.10 Marginal eﬀect of the ratio of hard currency debt to total debt
Note: Figures are calculated based on the model in column (1) of table 4.1.
Fig. 4.11 Z-statistics by observation from a test of the hypothesis that the mar-
ginal eﬀect is zeroﬁt is relatively good and the type II errors are mainly concentrated in the
country years immediately preceding or coming after actual crises.25
Column (2) of table 4.1 pares down the number of variables in the speciﬁ-
cation and looks more closely at the relationship between original sin and
debt crises. The quadratic is still evident. The point where the partial deriva-
tive of the predicted probability with respect to a change in the hard currency
debt ratio became negative is located around 0.35—the point where over a
third of all debt becomes payable in hard currency. At the average ratio of
hard-currency debt to total debt of 0.45, the marginal eﬀect of an increase in
the hard currency to total debt ratio is not statistically distinguishable from
zero. It is also interesting to note that observations where the gold cover ra-
tio is high and the level of hard-currency debt is very low or very high pro-
vide excellent predictors for the outcome “no debt crisis.” For column (1) the
statistical software (Stata) reports that over 140 of such outcomes are com-
pletely determined. We believe this is the reason why the statistical signiﬁ-
cance of these factors is so high, and we are reassured that these ﬁndings are
consistent with priors based on the theoretical framework outlined earlier.26
Column (3) shows that mismatches between interest payments in hard
currency and available reserves can also contribute to crises.27 Mismatch
ratios extend from –0.45 to 1.7, while the marginal eﬀects, evaluated at
each observation’s covariates and deﬁned as a function of the actual mis-
match, extend from about –1 to 2.7. For mismatch ratios from –0.45 to
about 0.2, the marginal eﬀects are zero or positive. For mismatch ratios be-
tween 0.2 and 0.5, a marginally better mismatch position decreases the pre-
dicted likelihood of a debt crisis (i.e., there is a negative coeﬃcient). After
a mismatch ratio of around 0.5 is attained, the marginal eﬀect returns to
zero. This is to say that there appears to be a point where additions to the
reserve base relative to foreign currency interest payments or increases in
export capacity have a limited eﬀect on crisis probability. Our previous dis-
cussion is one reason why improvements in the mismatch ratio are associ-
ated with more crises at low/intermediate levels of the variable.
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25. For other types of crises we fail to correctly classify many crisis episodes even at low
thresholds. We use the 0.1 barrier for currency and banking crises and 0.03 for the even rarer
twin crises. Obviously, our tabulations are sensitive to these thresholds. Our maximum pre-
dicted probabilities rarely exceed 0.2 for any type of crisis. Further modiﬁcations to the
methodology to allow for the rare events nature of the data should be pursued in further work
on the topic.
26. The hard-currency debt ratio is not a perfect predictor of debt crises.
27. We found no evidence that mismatches, measured using total debt outstanding (instead
of interest payments due), were statistically signiﬁcant. If we use the mismatch variable with
debt outstanding in column 1 instead of current interest payments, we ﬁnd a statistically in-
signiﬁcant quadratic with nearly the same shape as the reported regressions. If we enter the
mismatch variable by itself without the square term then there is a statistically signiﬁcant and
positive relationship between (better) mismatches and debt crises. Our discussion of why
there is a quadratic in mismatches probably explains the counterintuitive positive relation-
ship, and the insigniﬁcance of the quadratic of the mismatch could be due to errors in trying
to capture the actual mismatch position.Column (4) addresses the relationship between debt intolerance and
debt crises in a slightly larger sample than in column (1). Like in column
(1), an increase in the debt-to-revenue ratio is negatively associated with
crisis incidence when a country has no previous default history. However,
when a country had a default prior to 1880, a higher debt-to-revenue ratio
increases the chance of having a debt crisis (p-value 0.06). This would ap-
pear to be evidence in favor of the debt intolerance hypothesis, but it does
not come at the expense of a role for original sin or other debt management
policies. Moreover, there still appears to be a quadratic in original sin in
this speciﬁcation.
4.4.2 Currency Crises
Column (1) of table 4.2 presents an inclusive speciﬁcation where the de-
pendent variable is the probability of having a currency crisis. There are
seventeen events to be predicted in this sample. Few variables are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant except for the market portfolio spread and two indicator
variables that indicate if a debt crisis or a banking crisis occurred in the
next year.
The practical reason we include these leads for debt crises and banking
crises is because they are good proxies for initial troubles in the banking
sector or for unsustainable debt levels.28 The theoretical reason is that we
view a ﬁnancial crisis unfolding in three stages: ﬁrst, problems in the bank-
ing sector and deterioration in bank, ﬁrm, and government balance sheets
arise; this generates a currency crisis; ﬁnally, a more widespread crisis may
ensue, resulting in a full-blown banking crisis and/or debt default. The re-
sults in table 4.2 are consistent with this story.
In terms of signs on the coeﬃcients, we still see a quadratic in original
sin (though of opposite shape to that found in table 4.1)—a negative rela-
tionship between our mismatch variable and no sign of debt intolerance.
Some parameters on the other variables have the expected signs while oth-
ers do not. However, nothing in column (1) besides the crisis leads and the
market spread is statistically signiﬁcant.29
Financial Crises, 1880–1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt 163
28. Better indicators for early trouble in the banking sector might include growth rates of
nonperforming assets or bank insolvencies in the year of the currency crisis. None of these are
available in a systematic way. In terms of debt, various ratios could be used to judge sustain-
ability. Another reason we use this variable is to show how currency crises precede debt crises
and hence indirectly feed through to balance sheet problems associated with original sin.
29. As Flandreau and Zúmer (2004) have emphasized, the debt revenue ratio and the orig-
inal sin variables can increase when the nominal exchange rate changes and when there is
hard-currency debt. To the extent that this supports the argument that a banking crisis or a
debt crisis is more likely with a depreciation, then there is no problem here. One problem
could arise if we predict currency crises with variables that are functions of the nominal ex-
change rate. To avoid this issue we tried lagging such variables in the currency crisis speciﬁ-
cations. Our results regarding such variables in the currency crisis regressions are similar in
qualitative terms when we use one or two lags of mismatch, external to total debt and the debt
to revenue ratio.Table 4.2 Determinants of currency crises
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hard-currency debt as a percentage  –0.53 –0.34
of total debt (0.72) (0.71)
Square of hard-currency debt ratio 0.40 0.18
(0.75) (0.76)
Debt/Revenue –0.03 –0.03 –0.06 –0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Debt/Revenue   periphery indicator –0.09 –0.11 –0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Periphery indicator 0.72 0.59 0.47
(0.44) (0.50) (0.46)
Mismatch –0.08 –0.12 –0.07 –0.12
(0.11) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
Growth of terms of trade 8.72 7.56
(6.35) (6.82)
ln (deviation of real exchange rate from  0.19 –0.1 0.02 0.06
period average) (0.66) (0.78) (0.78) (0.75)
Trade balance/GDP 0.79 1.31 3.25 2.65
(1.73) (1.81) (1.45)∗∗ (1.26)∗∗
Spread on U.K. consol –0.02 –0.04
(0.07) (0.08)
Gold standard dummy 0.43
(0.52)
Growth of the money supply –0.89
(1.01)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation –0.34 –0.18 –0.19 –0.13
(0.45) (0.44) (0.27) (0.40)
Market portfolio spread 0.73 0.75 0.47 0.48
(0.18)∗∗∗ (0.20)∗∗∗ (0.16)∗∗∗ (0.16)∗∗∗
Debt crisis in t   1 0.83 0.68 0.42 0.50
(0.34)∗∗ (0.34)∗∗ (0.33) (0.38)
Banking crisis in t   1 0.74 0.68 0.71 0.70
(0.31)∗∗ (0.27)∗∗ (0.30)∗∗ (0.30)∗∗
Constant –3.00 –2.69 –2.24 –2.48
(0.79)∗∗∗ (0.57)∗∗∗ (0.29)∗∗∗ (0.47)∗∗∗
No. of observations 499 505 613 613
Percentage of correct positives 23.5 17.6 23.5 23.5
Percentage of correct negatives 95.4 95.8 96.4 96.1
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11
Log-likelihood value –63.8 –65.3 –69.6 –68.57
Notes:Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a currency crisis. “Robust” clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. See the text for precise deﬁnitions of variables. Positive signiﬁes crisis year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.We pare down the speciﬁcation in column (2) and ﬁnd an intuitive neg-
ative relationship between the mismatch variable (measured using total
debt outstanding rather than interest payments), which is signiﬁcant only
at the 81 percent level of conﬁdence. This is some very weak evidence that
liquidity problems are at play in a currency crisis. The trade balance has a
positive sign, as it did in the Frankel and Rose (1996) study of the late twen-
tieth century. Lagging this variable causes the magnitude of the coeﬃcient
and its statistical signiﬁcance to fall, suggesting some endogeneity prob-
lems.
We give mismatches a second chance in column (3). Mismatches are as-
sociated with a higher probability of a currency crash (p-value of 0.09).
This ﬁnding does not suggest that original sin is innocuous, but rather sug-
gests that countries that have original sin may be able to avoid currency
crises if they manage to collect adequate reserves or are suﬃciently open.
Moreover, it may back up the argument in Eichengreen, Hausmann, and
Panizza (2003) that original sin is a second-best outcome. If countries can-
not issue own-currency debt and then are forced by market discipline to
hold costly reserves to insure themselves against currency speculation, this
may not be socially optimal. Finally, we note that a higher gold cover ratio
is associated with a lower probability of a crisis, although it is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, and a greater trade surplus relative to GDP is associated
with a higher chance of a currency crisis.30
In column (4) we drop some of the least signiﬁcant variables and focus
on debt intolerance. This makes for a slightly larger sample. There is no
sign that a spotty record on debt combines with the debt burden to gener-
ate an increased chance of currency crises. The interaction of the debt ra-
tio with the periphery dummy is negative and larger in absolute terms than
the uninteracted coeﬃcient. But all coeﬃcients are far from statistically
signiﬁcant. Though we do not report it, using the pre-1880 default indica-
tor only makes this negative result stronger. It also makes the coeﬃcient on
mismatch become highly statistically signiﬁcant and negative. This implies
that improvement in the mismatch is associated with less of a chance of a
crisis.
4.4.3 Banking Crises
Banking crises also seem to be associated with original sin and currency
mismatches, but not with debt intolerance. The latter might be expected as
international perceptions of sovereign debt management and ﬁscal con-
straints might not necessarily have an eﬀect on the liquidity or solvency of
the banking system. On the other hand, banking trouble associated with
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30. The seemingly counterintuitive result that net exporters have a higher chance of a crisis
seems to arise from the fact that the small peripheral countries in our sample tend to be net
exporters while Great Britain, France, and Switzerland, for example, have highly negative ra-
tios for this variable and have had, of course, very few crises.currency mismatches and hard-currency liabilities might be expected. We
have already seen that currency crises are likely to be followed by banking
crises.
When the exchange rate changes precipitously, bank balance sheets
could be at risk, for various reasons. In countries with bond-based bank-
ing systems, if governments neglected to redeem their bonds in gold terms
or had to default because of the increased burden placed on them by gold
debt, bank balance sheets could suﬀer. For similar reasons, if loans are
made by international banks or through domestic banks that have inter-
national liabilities, currency depreciation could easily impair the net worth
of the banking sector. International lending through correspondent banks
was prevalent in South America—for example, through the Rothschilds
(Brazil) and the House of Baring (in Argentina). Moreover, our results sug-
gest that when countries have a stronger gold reserve position the danger
of hard currency debt is lower.
Column (1) of table 4.3 shows again the quadratic relationship between
hard currency debt and banking crises. It also shows a signiﬁcant and neg-
ative relationship between our mismatch variable and the probability of a
crisis. The existence of a central bank, adherence to the gold standard,
lower growth of the money supply (or of the note circulation), appreciation
of the real exchange rate, lower gold cover ratios, higher trade deﬁcits, and
improvement in the terms of trade are associated with lower chances of a
crisis. The square of original sin, mismatch, the trade balance, and the gold
standard variable are signiﬁcant at better than the 10 percent level.31 Little
else is statistically signiﬁcant here, and the signs on the gold cover ratio and
the trade balance are opposite of what one might expect.
Column (2) of table 4.3 shows how the coeﬃcients on the two controls
for original sin provide a quadratic ﬁt, but both are statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. Nevertheless, the mismatch control has a negative sign and is signiﬁ-
cant at the 86 percent level of conﬁdence. Column (3) drops the mismatch
variable and provides more support for a link between original sin and
banking crises as the standard errors on the original sin variables shrink in
relation to their point estimates, making them both signiﬁcant at about the
90 percent level of conﬁdence. Finally, column (4) provides no evidence of
debt intolerance. However, mismatches are again signiﬁcant, as is the neg-
ative relationship between the gold standard and banking crises.
Table 4.4 shows that ﬁnding determinants of twin crises is more diﬃcult.
In the comprehensive speciﬁcation of column (1), only the trade balance
is signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, the quadratic relation-
ship between original sin and such crises is evident, and each coeﬃcient is
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31. The negative gold standard coeﬃcient may be contradictory to the positive coeﬃcient
we found in table 4.1. Again, the results are fragile to the particular speciﬁcation so there is
little we can say deﬁnitively.Table 4.3 Determinants of banking crises
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hard-currency debt as a percentage  1.32 0.62 1.10
of total debt (0.71) (0.92) (0.67)
Square of hard-currency debt ratio –2.36 –0.90 –1.20
(0.70)∗∗∗ (0.84) (0.71)
Debt/Revenue –0.05 –0.05 –0.01 –0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Debt/Revenue   periphery indicator –0.04
(0.08)
Periphery indicator –1.15
(0.92)
Debt/Revenue   pre-1880 default –0.10
(0.07)
Pre-1880 default 0.02
(0.52)
Mismatch –0.17 –0.07 –0.16
(0.07)∗∗ (0.05) (0.08)∗∗
Growth of terms of trade –7.01 –6.67
(5.47) (5.52)
ln (deviation of real exchange rate from  –0.81 –0.24 –0.21 –0.33
period average) (0.85) (0.72) (0.70) (0.29)
Trade balance/GDP 6.50 4.93 4.17 4.60
(2.11)∗∗∗ (1.98)∗∗ (1.83)∗∗ (2.41)
Central bank indicator –0.54 –0.12 –0.02 0.07
(0.43) (0.28) (0.23) (0.32)
Gold standard dummy –0.87 –0.33 –0.23 –0.65
(0.42)∗∗ (0.33) (0.28) (0.35)
Growth of the money supply 1.03 0.67 0.65
(1.11) (0.87) (0.88)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation 0.82 0.99 0.65 0.78
(0.47) (0.40)∗∗∗ (0.25)∗∗∗ (0.48)
Market portfolio spread 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.42
(0.30) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25)
Constant –0.82 –2.26 –2.43 –1.95
(0.84) (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.34)∗∗∗ (0.53)∗∗∗
No. of observations 485 549 549 491
Percentage of correct positives 27.7 10.5 5.2 21
Percentage of correct negatives 96 97.1 98.1 96.6
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.08
Log-likelihood –68.46 –76.9 –77.8 –74.1
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. “Robust” clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. See the text for precise deﬁnitions of variables. Positive signiﬁes crisis year.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.signiﬁcant at a bit better than the 90 percent conﬁdence level (p-values are
0.083 and 0.060 respectively). In column (2) we control for mismatches with
an interaction between original sin and the reserve-to-import ratio. We ﬁnd
that the debt revenue ratio is positively associated with twin crises (p-value
0.118) and that higher gold cover ratios and a more tranquil international
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Table 4.4 Determinants of twin crises
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
Hard-currency debt as a percentage of  1.33 0.39 1.51
total debt (0.77) (0.47) (0.61)∗∗
Square of hard-currency debt ratio –1.83 –1.46
(0.98) (0.72)∗∗
Hard-currency ratio   (reserves/imports) –1.21
(0.89)
Reserves/Imports 1.42
(0.66)∗∗
Debt/Revenue 0.008 0.04 0.03
(0.08) (0.03) (0.02)
Debt/Revenue   periphery indicator –0.05
(0.13)
Periphery indicator –0.42
(0.65)
Mismatch –0.09
(0.09)
Growth of terms of trade –11.39
(8.38)
ln (deviation of real exchange rate from  0.18 –0.13 0.09
period average) (0.47) (0.37) (0.33)
Trade balance/GDP 5.14 3.11
(2.6)∗∗ (1.80)
Spread on U.K. consol 0.08
(0.06)
Gold reserves/notes in circulation –0.52 –1.57 –0.56
(0.61) (0.53)∗∗∗ (0.41)
Market portfolio spread 0.12 0.25 0.16
(0.22) (0.13) (0.15)
Constant –2.04 –2.68 –2.58
(0.51)∗∗∗ (0.45)∗∗∗ (0.25)∗∗∗
No. of observations 497 625 605
Percentage of correct positives 50 50 50
Percentage of correct negatives 89.9 87 88.7
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.10 0.11
Log-likelihood value –35.6 –38.3 –37.9
Notes:Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a twin crisis. “Robust” clustered standard
errors are in parentheses. Positive signiﬁes crisis year. See the text for precise deﬁnitions of
variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.environment (p-value 0.053) are associated with fewer twin crises.32The in-
teraction terms suggest that more reserves decrease the chances of having a
twin crisis, but this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. The speciﬁcation in
column (2) also suggests that a higher ratio of reserves to imports is associ-
ated with a greater chance of a twin crisis. Perhaps this is because crisis-
prone countries stock up on reserves prior to a crisis. Column (3) eliminates
some of the variables and still ﬁnds a hump-shaped relationship (positive
below a ratio of about 0.5 and negative above) between original sin and twin
crises, with each coeﬃcient signiﬁcant when evaluated at the means. Fur-
ther speciﬁcations revealed no particular relationships between our other
measure of mismatches, default history, and twin crises.
4.4.4 Robustness and Reﬂections
Earlier, we found some evidence that after a certain point more hard cur-
rency debt relative to the total seemed to be associated with fewer debt
crises and banking crises. One possibility is that the level of original sin is
correlated with factors or characteristics of countries we have left out of
the analysis. That is to say, perhaps those most at risk take care to protect
their ﬁnancial systems from crises or have eﬀective ways of dealing with
crises despite their high levels of original sin. If these factors were constant
over time, an econometric solution to such a problem is to include country-
level indicator variables.
Since this is infeasible to do in a limited dependent variable model with
our particular data conﬁguration, we move to a “ﬁxed eﬀects” linear prob-
ability model estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Table 4.5 respec-
iﬁes the models of column (1) from tables 4.1 through 4.4 in this way. Like
the previous results, the models ﬁt fairly poorly since there are so few crises
compared to noncrisis years. Many of the coeﬃcients on the basic macro-
controls are statistically insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless, the results regarding
the coeﬃcients on the original sin and mismatch variables are qualitatively
very similar to the ﬁndings in the previous tables.
For debt crises, we ﬁnd evidence of the very same quadratic pattern from
table 4.1. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on hard-
currency debt and its square are diﬀerent from zero at the 95 percent conﬁ-
dence level. For currency crises, the link between a crisis and original sin is
indirect and seems to be coming through the outbreak of banking problems
or eventual debt crises. Also, columns (3) and (4) show that better mis-
matches are associated with lower chances of having a banking crisis or a
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32. Throughout the paper we have used the GDP-weighted spread on consols as a time-
speciﬁc measure of international capital market turbulence. It is also a fact that this measure
declines strongly over time and could be picking up other factors, such as increased liquidity
in international capital markets, a more tranquil political environment, the shift from deﬂa-
tion after 1896 (as Flandreau, Le Cacheux, and Zúmer [1998] argue), and other environmen-
tal factors that change over time in step.Table 4.5 “Fixed eﬀects” linear probability speciﬁcations
Debt crises Currency crises Banking crises Twin crises
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hard-currency debt as a percentage of  0.14 –0.11 0.14 0.08
total debt (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10)
Square of hard-currency debt ratio –0.29 –0.06 –0.19 –0.19
(0.11)∗∗∗ (0.14) (0.16) (0.11)
Debt/Revenue 0.01 0.004 –0.01 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Debt/Revenue   periphery indicator –0.01 0.0003 0.003
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Debt/Revenue   pre-1880 default 0.01
(0.01)
Mismatch 0.11 –0.01 –0.03 –0.02
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Square of mismatch –0.11
(0.08
Growth of terms of trade –0.39 0.66 –0.72 –0.51
(0.43) (0.58) (0.62) (0.41)
ln (deviation of real exchange rate from  –0.22 0.02 –0.11 –0.03
period average) (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Trade balance/GDP –0.18 –0.01 0.29 0.1
(0.20) (0.29) (0.30) (0.20)
Spread on U.K. consol 0.04
(0.01)∗∗∗
Central bank indicator 0.02
(0.08)
Gold standard dummy –0.02 –0.08 –0.08
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Growth of the money supply 0.02 –0.12 0.23
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10)∗∗
Gold reserves/notes in circulation 0 0.03 0.03 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
Market portfolio spread –0.01 0.04 0.02 –0.002
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Debt crisis in t   1 0.08
(0.05)
Banking crisis in t   1 0.1
(0.04)∗∗
Constant –0.14 0.05 0.04 0.01
(0.06)∗∗ (0.09) (0.11) (0.06)
No. of observations 371 499 485 497
R2 0.06 0.004 0.008 0.01
F-stat 6.81 1.34 1.93 2.02
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a banking crisis. Estimation is by OLS. “Robust”
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for precise deﬁnitions of variables. 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.twin crisis. The coeﬃcients are highly statistically signiﬁcant as well. For
these latter types of crisis it could be said that better reserve positions or be-
ing more open to exports for a given level of original sin helped avoid trouble.
We are also apparently left with the result that time-invariant underlying
fundamentals like empire status or resource endowments cannot explain
how places like the United States, Canada, Australia, and Scandinavia
managed to carry high original sin and also avoid severe ﬁnancial crises.
This suggests the possibility that these places had a more active approach
to managing crises or that their ﬁnancial systems were structured in a way
that helped stave oﬀ ﬁnancial meltdown following a major shock.33 Oppo-
site these is little evidence that places like Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Italy,
and Portugal faced ﬁnancial meltdowns because of time-invariant charac-
teristics such as bad government or institutions or simply because they
were in the geographic or economic periphery.
In part, such omitted factors may be playing a role in giving rise to the
hump-shaped relationship between crisis probability and hard-currency
debt.34They probably explain why the positive marginal eﬀect of original sin
becomes negative at high levels of original sin. Predicted values of having a
debt crisis from the regression in column (2) of table 4.1 and the actual val-
ues of original sin are shown in ﬁgure 4.12. The countries at the far right end
of the ﬁgure (the United States, Canada, and Australia) with total foreign
currency and gold clause debt were special cases.35They may have had other
means of protecting themselves from reversals and long, drawn-out crises.
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33. The endogeneity of the level of original sin should be explored and other experiences
across time should be compared. The endogeneity bias would appear to be small. Eichen-
green, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003, 2005), and Flandreau and Sussman (2005) take the
view that original sin is inversely related to country size. Having a ﬁnancial center also de-
creases original sin. Being large and/or having a ﬁnancial center makes for liquid markets in
the domestic currency and increases the demand for such assets in the portfolio of interna-
tional investors. Because of this, endogeneity may be less of an issue than one might conjec-
ture at the outset. Evidence from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in Bordo,
Meissner, and Redish (2005) suggests that wars and large shocks that closed international
markets and forced governments into the domestic markets catalyzed the process. Still other
factors are obviously necessary for these factors to be viable explanations.
34. In other un-reported speciﬁcations, we tried using proxies for good institutions and ﬁ-
nancial development in our probit models. We included the ratio of the money stock to GDP,
a British Empire indicator, a central bank indicator, and a branch bank indicator. None of
these variables eliminated the quadratic pattern or gave rise to a conditionally positive rela-
tionship between original sin and debt crises, currency crises, or banking crises. In the debt
crisis speciﬁcations, it is not feasible to estimate the equations with an empire dummy simply
because no included dominion, colony, or other member of the British Commonwealth ever
had a debt default in this period. This indicator would be a perfect predictor of not having a
debt crisis. So we are left clinging to the notion that the small countries with lots of original
sin, like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and perhaps the Scandinavian countries, were
diﬀerent along other dimensions than those captured by these proxy variables. Caballero,
Cowan, and Kearns (2004) talk about currency-trust and country-trust, which could be fac-
tors at play here but are not easily captured by any one explanatory variable.
35. Two data points, Argentina in 1893 and 1894, just after the Baring crisis, are notable ex-
ceptions to the rest of the scatter. The fact that the crisis had not yet been fully resolved ex-
plains why the predicted values are so high, and because of this we do not believe that this
negates the quadratic relationship we have identiﬁed.The United States was lucky to have had a deep and relatively well-
functioning ﬁnancial system, allowing it to resolve crises rapidly. Public
debt levels were fairly low, were well-managed since Alexander Hamilton’s
funding plan in 1790, and from a long-term perspective had sound eco-
nomic fundamentals. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had branch
banking. The short maturities at which intermediaries lent their funds al-
lowed for more prudent risk-taking by borrowers. The dominions and the
United States, then, shared the fundamentals, the ﬁscal institutions, and
the creditor protections necessary to maintain good borrowing practices.
The commitment and ability to maintain gold pegs in the British Com-
monwealth were stronger and more durable than in the independent coun-
tries with sovereign governments and national monetary systems. New
Zealand banks held large sterling asset positions in London and also had
an incentive to maintain the peg against sterling. Creditors to the domin-
ions often felt that repayment was a certainty because many issues carried
the guarantee of the British government. Debt was also given trustee sta-
tus later in this period. This channelled Trustee Saving Bank funds into
colonial securities, raising bond prices and making investors feel that such
securities were less risky than they probably were. In such a case, this debt
was less likely to give rise to self-fulﬁlling crises.
All of this suggests that without the special relationships and other idio-
syncrasies that allowed for a robust reaction in turbulent times unique to
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Fig. 4.12 Actual and predicted debt crisis frequencies versus the ratio of hard cur-
rency public debt to total public debt, 1880–1913
Notes: Predicted values come from the probit “regression” in column (2) of table 4.1. They
are the predicted probabilities arising from the probit likelihood function using the estimated
coeﬃcients and evaluating the function at the actual covariates for each country year obser-
vation. Actual frequencies of debt crises are calculated as in ﬁgure 4.4. The actual frequencies
are plotted against the period average values of the hard currency debt ratio. The predicted
probabilities are plotted against the ratio in the given year. See text for other deﬁnitions.these British oﬀshoots and the United States (and perhaps others, such as
the Scandinavian countries), original sin is positively associated with the
frequency of crises. The countries in the southern cone of Latin America
and southern and eastern Europe (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Portugal, Spain,
Italy, Greece, and Russia) that embraced global ﬁnancial ﬂows but did not
adequately fortify their ﬁnancial systems each faced at least one severe ﬁ-
nancial crisis enveloping the banking system, the currency, and usually the
national debt between 1880 and 1913.36
The other group of countries toward the left hand side of ﬁgure 4.12 de-
serves some mention too. First, many ﬁnancial centers, like Great Britain,
France, and the Netherlands are here. Their low levels of original sin, liq-
uid markets, and sound fundamentals made crisis management easier. One
notable exception that looks more like a periphery country, however, seems
to have been Austria-Hungary, which had established a signiﬁcant domes-
tic debt market in our period. This likely reﬂected much-improved ﬁscal
fundamentals (see Flandreau and Komlos 2002 and Komlos 1987).37
A number of other European countries in the middle group that had
lower levels of original sin than the settler countries and Scandinavia but
were ﬁnancially crisis prone (e.g., Spain, Portugal, and Italy) had sizeable
domestic currency debt markets, and some even had sovereign bond issues
denominated in their own currencies listed on the exchanges in London
and Paris. These countries were quite open to international trade and had
developed ﬁnancial centers much earlier, reﬂecting their entrepôt position
within European trade (Flandreau and Sussman 2005).
While the precedent of domestic debt issue had been established in these
countries, ﬁscal and ﬁnancial soundness did not prevail. In reaction to
their vulnerability, some of these countries developed methods of crisis
prevention not used in the dominions or in the United States. The aﬃdavit
system required domestic creditors be paid in paper money while foreign-
ers were paid in gold (see Tattara 2003). But these experiences also further
demonstrate that hard currency debt made it more diﬃcult to manage a
crisis event, and the repercussions of a bad shock were all the greater when
not dealt with in a just and eﬃcient way.
Overall, our results suggest that the contemporary theoretical frame-
work that views balance sheets as important determinants of ﬁnancial
crises are just as valid during the late nineteenth century. Like the late
twentieth century, this period was one of freely ﬂowing cross-border cap-
Financial Crises, 1880–1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt 173
36. Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003, 15) might agree: “In particular, countries
with strong institutions, capable of running strong policies, are in the best position to cope
with the potential mismatch problem.” To solve the problem of original sin, policymakers
must decide whether it is easier to take steps to eliminate original sin or to fortify the ﬁnan-
cial system and live with original sin in the medium run.
37. There was also an eﬀort to increase the transparency of the budgetary process and an
increase in creditors’ protection in this period. See Becker (1913).ital ﬂows that met with various levels of ﬁnancial sophistication and ﬁscal
rigor in its global reach for yield. As ﬁnancial weaknesses became appar-
ent, the markets reacted in ways reminiscent of the ﬁnancial crises of the
1990s.
4.5 Conclusions
We believe we have found some interesting features in the data that have
not previously been systematically addressed in either contemporary or
historical literatures. Most importantly, we ﬁnd that hard-currency debt
may not always generate ﬁnancial crises. Some countries with very high
levels of original sin have apparently been less prone to debt crises than
those with intermediate levels. Aside from these extreme cases where orig-
inal sin seems less dangerous, there appears to be a positive relationship
between original sin and the incidence of debt crises.
It is interesting that we ﬁnd that holding our currency mismatch measure
constant, more original sin makes countries more crisis prone up to a cer-
tain point, and then less vulnerable to debt crises that are often the culmi-
nation of a full-blown ﬁnancial catastrophe. One plausible explanation is
that countries with high levels of original sin also had natural hedges, bet-
ter balance sheets, or better ways of dealing with ﬁnancial stress that are
hard to quantify. This is compelling, because we know anecdotally that the
dominions had large sterling balances and that they had good ﬁscal insti-
tutions. A question for further research is whether it was the structure of
their ﬁnancial systems or the actual level of sterling bank assets which we
cannot determine. We tend to think it is the former rather than the latter.
Holding original sin levels constant, we also ﬁnd that mismatches mat-
ter. When countries have hard-currency obligations, they seem less prone
to debt, banking, or currency crises when they oﬀset these liabilities with
gold reserves or are more open. This obviously does not negate the idea
that original sin could be responsible for currency and banking trouble.
Those countries that do not hold suﬃcient reserves in their banking sec-
tors, which may be a reﬂection of either weak banking structure, and/or a
lack of political will to take adequate insurance, face a higher chance of a
crisis situation. The absence of original sin could be an improvement for
such countries if the goal is to reduce crisis incidence.38 At the same time,
it also highlights our key ﬁnding—that countries can and have found ways
to avoid ﬁnancial fragility when they have dollarized liabilities.
These results also tend to conﬁrm that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd robust deter-
minants of ﬁnancial crises. This suggests that standard econometric ap-
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38. This, of course, leaves open the question of social optimality. Perhaps hard-currency
debt is a disciplining device, or asset holders would be worse oﬀ without hard-currency debt.
The question deserves more research.proaches may not be resoundingly successful or that the theory is too ab-
stract to deal with the messy reality of historical crisis episodes. These com-
plications are in addition to the other data problems we mentioned. Still, as
a means of summarizing the data, multivariate analysis can be useful.
The ostensible quadratic relationship between hard-currency debt rela-
tive to total debt and debt crises is the most novel. Why is it there? We
believe that this quadratic is obscuring a positive relationship between
hard-currency debt and debt crises that exists for the average small, inde-
pendent, emerging market type of country.
So the lesson for today’s and tomorrow’s emerging market economies is
to become more like today’s advanced countries. Many of the leading
economies today had original sin even as they received massive capital in-
ﬂows from abroad. They also faced limited exposure to crises. What was in-
volved was following careful debt management policies and the develop-
ment of sound ﬁscal and ﬁnancial institutions. In the interim, large foreign
exchange reserves and a strong export position can also help governments
and ﬁrms to navigate the choppy waters of global ﬁnance.
Data Appendix
General Notes
Debt:In general we have deﬁned external debt or hard currency debt as the
amount outstanding of long-term debt issued abroad plus the amount
outstanding of domestic gold (or silver) debt. Internal debt refers to the
outstanding stock of debt payable exclusively in domestic currency.
However, in a few cases listed below we have not been able to discern
from the sources how much of the domestic or internal debt was payable
in gold. More work will have to be put into these cases. However, one will
note that for these cases the total amount of domestic debt is rather
small.
Real exchange rates: The real exchange rate is deﬁned as the product of the
exchange rate (price of local currency per pound) and the U.K. price
level divided by the local price level. Price levels come from Obstfeld and
Taylor (2003). We use the percentage deviation from the within country
average to obviate problems with levels. The average is taken over the en-
tire period 1880–1913.
Market portfolio spread: We use a GDP-weighted average spread of long-
term bonds against the British consol constructed by Obstfeld and Tay-
lor (2003) to control for time-speciﬁc international changes in capital
markets.
Exchange rate regimes: Data on gold standard adherence comes from
Meissner (2005), augmented with data from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Financial Crises, 1880–1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt 175Default indicator: Our default indicator was created if there were one or
more defaults prior to 1880. This data is taken from a spreadsheet under-
lying Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003).
Crisis dating: As in Bordo et al. (2001) we date currency and banking crises
using both qualitative and quantitative evidence. For all countries besides
Austria-Hungary, Russia, New Zealand, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey,
Egypt, Uruguay, and India we have relied on the dates of Bordo et al. We
have tried to date currency crises, when possible, by using an approach
based on the exchange market pressure (EMP) methodology, which looks
at changes in reserves, the exchange rate, and the interest rate.
Debt crisis dates were based on Beim and Calomiris (2001). Only private
lending to sovereign nations is considered when building those default dates.
Not every instance of technical default is included in the chronology. The au-
thors identiﬁed periods (six months or more) where all or part of the interest/
principal payments were suspended, reduced, or rescheduled. Some of those
episodes are outright debt repudiations, while others were reschedulings agreed
upon mutually by lenders and borrowers. Also, data is taken from a spreadsheet
underlying Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003). We have relied extensively
on data underlying Bordo et al. and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). We cite these
papers below though data is available by personal communication.
Argentina
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Total funded debt from 1880 to 1913 from Vázquez-
Presedo (1988). The external debt data from 1880 to 1891 comes from
Conde (1995). The percentage of debt serviced in gold was taken from
Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Australia
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Total debt: Ferguson and Schularick (2006); percentage
176 Michael D. Bordo and Christopher M. Meissnerof debt payable in gold or foreign currency, Bordo, Meissner, and Redish
(2005).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993a).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Mitchell (1993a).
Imports: Mitchell (1993a).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Mitchell (1993a).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993a).
GDP-weighted average spread on British consol: Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003).
Austria-Hungary
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: The source is the statistical yearbooks for both countries.
External debt consists of domestic gold debt and foreign currency debt.
Internal debt is domestic paper debt. Data for 1880 is from Flandreau
and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Mitchell (1992).
Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Belgium
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Total public debt from Annuaire Statistique and Fenn’s
Compendium. Level of debt payable in gold is from Flandreau and
Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
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Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Brazil
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Debt in foreign currency (1880–1914), domestic paper,
and gold debt (1880–1912) from Statistical Yearbook and Levy (1995).
For 1913 and 1914 the data given in the sources for external debt only in-
cluded foreign currency debt and was denominated in sterling.
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Canada
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Bordo, Meissner, and Redish (2005).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993b).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Mitchell (1993b).
Imports: Mitchell (1993b).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Mitchell (1993b).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993b).
Chile
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: External and domestic debt from 1880 to 1897 from
Molino (1898; no information about domestic gold debt). From 1898
onward the source is the statistical yearbook for Chile for internal gold,
178 Michael D. Bordo and Christopher M. Meissnerexternal and domestic paper debt. 1911–12, total and foreign debt come
from Ferguson and Schularick (2006).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993b).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Barbieri (2000).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: 1887–95, Molino (1898).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993b).
Denmark
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt:For 1880, 1886 and 1890 the source is Fenn’s Compendium.
No information about domestic gold debt was available but our numbers
are highly consistent with Flandreau and Zúmer’s (2004) for the total
debt payable in gold. Total debt: 1881, 1882, 1884, 1885, 1887–89, 1891–
93, Ferguson and Schularick (2006). 1894–1913, Statistical Yearbook.
Debt payable in gold 1881–85, 1887–89, 1891–93, Flandreau and Zúmer
(2004); 1894–1913 Statistical Yearbook.
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Egypt
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: 1880–1915 total public debt, Government revenues and
government expenditures from Crouchley (1938). Consumer Price In-
dexes 1913 to 1915, Money supply 1901–15 (includes Currency and
Bank notes in circulation and deposits in savings banks), are from
Mitchell (1993b) and Crouchley. For foreign trade aggregates and crisis
dates the source is Crouchley.
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993a).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
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Exports: Barbieri (2000).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Not available.
Finland
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt:1880–1915 public debt in marks from statistical yearbook.
1881, 1891 foreign and domestic debt from Fenn’s Compendium. It ap-
pears that the entire debt was external before 1915. Yearbook presents
total debt from 1880 to 1901 and then only foreign debt from 1901 to
1915, but the values for external and total debt in 1901 are the same. If
we consider the data from Fenn’s,the ratio of external to total was 88 per-
cent in 1881 and 92 percent in 1891.
Government revenue: Not available.
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Mitchell (1992).
Imports: Mitchell (1992).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data generously made available by Alan M.
Taylor, UC Davis.
Gold reserves: Obstfeld and Jones (2003).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1992).
France
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
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Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: State debt is excluded; Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Greece
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: 1881, external and total debt from Fenn’s. 1885–1913,
Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Prices from Flandreau and Zúmer (2004), exchange
rates, Bordo and Jonung (1996).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Kostelenos (1995).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
India
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt:Funded rupee debt and funded sterling debt from Reserve
Bank of India Banking and Monetary Statistics of India (1954). No in-
formation about domestic gold debt. Money supply data from Gold-
smith (1983).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993a).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Mitchell (1993a).
Imports: Mitchell (1993a).
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Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993a).
Population: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Italy
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Total and foreign debt from Zamagni (1998, 1999). For-
eign debt includes only rendita interest paid abroad in foreign currency
or gold. See Flandreau and Zúmer (2004) for a short discussion on this
point.
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001)
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Japan
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Internal and external debt from 1892–1913, Statistical
Yearbook of Japan, no information was given about domestic gold debt.
1882 and 1887 foreign and total debt from Fenn’s (no information about
domestic gold debt). Total debt 1880–91 from Kikuchi (1904). 1897 for-
eign debt source is Furuya (1928), which includes government foreign
bonds, domestic bonds sold abroad, domestic bonds shipped abroad,
and corporation bonds. This series hence may contain some paper bond
issues held abroad which would contaminate our measure of original
sin. The amounts would not be large, we conjecture.
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993a).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Mitchell (1993a).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
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Gold reserves: Jones and Obstfeld (2000).
Notes in circulation: Masayoshi (1899).
Mexico
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: External and internal debt from Bazant (1968), Ludlow 
& Marichal (1998) and Perez-Siller (1995). Only includes federal debt,
no information about domestic gold or silver debt. Total debt and for-
eign debt 1881, 1883, 1885, 1891, 1892, 1895, 1897–1904, 1906–10, Fer-
guson and Schularick (2006).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993b).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Barbieri (2000).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Not available.
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply:Mitchell (1993b). Money supply includes de-
posits in commercial banks and currency and bank notes in circula-
tion.
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993b).
Population: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
The Netherlands
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Total consolidated debt sources are statistical yearbook
and Fenn’s. Except 1882–85, Flandreau and Zúmer (2004). Following
Flandreau and Sussman (2005), Netherlands had no hard currency
debt.
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports and Imports: Smits, Horlings, and van Zanden (1999).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply:1880–99 measured as the growth of M3. 1901–
13, growth of money supply is the growth of M2. Data generously made
available by Alan M. Taylor.
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Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
New Zealand
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Bordo, Meissner, and Redish (2005).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993a).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Imports: Mitchell (1993a).
Exports: Mitchell (1993a).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993a).
Norway
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt:External and domestic debt from statistical yearbook. No
information about whether the domestic debt was payable in specie. It is
possible that the domestic debt actually had gold clauses. Still, the
amount of domestic debt as a part of the total is very small.
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Mitchell (1992).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo and Jonung (1996).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Peru
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Not available.
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993b).
Terms of trade: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Real exchange rate: Not available.
Current account surplus: Not available.
Nominal GDP: Not available.
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Growth of the money supply: Not available.
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Not available.
Population: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Portugal
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt:Total debt, 1880–1913, Flandreau and Zúmer; percentage
of debt serviced in gold, Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: 1880–90. Growth of circulation in hands of
public and commercial bank deposits. Data from Alan M. Taylor by
private correspondence. 1891–1913, Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1992).
Russia
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: 1880, 1887, 1891 total debt from Fenn’s. 1880 hard cur-
rency debt from Fenn’s. Foreign debt is reported as including domestic
gold debt and internal debt. Total debt: 1881–84, 1885–86, 1888–90,
1893, 1894, Ferguson and Schularick (2004). 1885 total debt, Pasvolsky
and Moulton (1924). 1895 to 1913, total debt. Percentage of debt serv-
iced in gold, 1884–1913, Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Current account surplus: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Kahan (1989).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
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Before union the data is constructed as an aggregate from available data
from Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal.
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Bordo, Meissner, Redish (2005).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993a).
Terms of trade: Not available.
Exports: Global Financial Database.
Imports: Global Financial Database.
Nominal GDP: 1911–13, Mitchell (1993a).
Yield spread between British consols: Not available.
Growth of the money supply: Mitchell (1993a).
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Not available.
Population: Schuman (1938).
Spain
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: External and internal debt from Acha (1976). No infor-
mation about gold debt.
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Data underlying Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Sweden
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Total debt (dette publique en obligations) and internal
debt 1913 Statistical Yearbookof Sweden. Foreign debt 1880, 1887, 1891
from Fenn’s. No information about domestic gold debts.
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
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Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Switzerland
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: 1880–1913, Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Turkey
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Not available.
Government revenue: 1884–1900, Du Velay (1903); for 1880, 1901–03,
1908–10 Shaw (1975).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Not available.
Exports: Global Financial Database.
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Not available.
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Not available.
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Not available.
Population: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Great Britain
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: 1880–1913 total debt, Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Great Britain had no hard currency debt in this period, to the best of our
knowledge.
Government revenue: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Interest service on debt: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
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Exports: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
Notes in circulation: Flandreau and Zúmer (2004).
United States
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Total debt, 1880–1913: Ferguson and Schularick (2006).
All debt is payable in gold following Bordo, Meissner, and Redish (2005).
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993b).
Terms of trade: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Real exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Barbieri (2000).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Bordo et al. (2001), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: Bordo et al. (2001).
Gold reserves: Obstfeld and Jones (2003).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993b).
Uruguay
Total outstanding government debt, external hard-currency debt, and domes-
tic paper debt: Internal and external debt from Statistical Yearbook, no
information about domestic gold debt.
Government revenue: Mitchell (1993b).
Terms of trade: Not available.
Real exchange rate: 1900–13, Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Exports: Barbieri (2000).
Imports: Barbieri (2000).
Nominal GDP: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
Yield spread between British consols: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Growth of the money supply: 1901–13, Mitchell (1993b).
Gold reserves: Not available.
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (1993b).
Population: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
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